Five chapters from Morgenthau’s book, Germany is our Problem, here published with an introductory note by Ellopos. Emphasis, in bold or italic letters, by Ellopos. Complete book in print.
But Germany kept intact far more powerful forces for evil
than those she lost.
She kept her people's lust for conquest, her heavy
industries, her general staff.
She kept her shipyards, her research laboratories, her
shrewd cartel system.
She kept extensive assets abroad, an illusion that she had
been betrayed instead of beaten, the know-how and the skilled labor in all the
fields essential to war.
Upon this foundation, she built for war so skillfully and
camouflaged it so well at first that only a few realists, dismissed outside
Germany as crackpots or hate mongers, were aware of it.
Once the camouflage was thrown aside, the world could hardly
believe its eyes. Yet the relentless, almost logical progress of a nation's
will to war had been going on for years without a check.
Cautious at first but gradually accelerating, Germany moved
toward her goal. She seemed invincible until she hit something even
stronger—the British spirit of the blitz in 1940; the Russian spirit of
Stalingrad and Leningrad in 1942. These were the high-water marks of Germany's
sea of blood. How did the waves rise so high in so short a time?
The preparation for 1939 began even before the armistice of
1918. That summer the military leaders knew they were beaten, at least for the
time being. To Ludendorff, the strategist of German headquarters, August 8 was
the "black day" of the German Army, although the Allied generals were
grimly preparing for a campaign of 1919 and even 1920. It was the German high
command that engineered the "revolution" which sent the Kaiser into
exile and brought forward a group of unhappy civilians to take the odium of
surrender. The high command never loosed its grip on the strings that
controlled this and the succeeding puppet governments of republican Germany.