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Henry Morgenthau, The German Character
Five chapters from Morgenthau’s book, Germany is our Problem, here published with an introductory note by Ellopos. Emphasis, in bold or italic letters, by Ellopos. Complete book in print.
52 Pages
Page 17
The Ruhr Valley had 70 per cent to 80 per cent of Germany's coal production (not including lignite). Furthermore, Ruhr coal was especially well adapted for coking and therefore for steelmaking. The existence of this coal was the reason why the Ruhr became the greatest single industrial center in Europe. And coal is the foundation, too, of a great deal of Germany's electrical and chemical progress. It would probably be the magnet drawing to itself any future German effort to re-establish heavy industry. Even after the removal of all Ruhr factories that escaped destruction in the war, the mines would remain a potential source of German rearmament. The coal cannot be taken away from the Ruhr (except by the trainload as it is mined), so the Ruhr should be taken away from Germany. Annexed to any other country, it would be a perpetual storm center, but it could safely be placed under the control of a governing body established by the United Nations. The exact form and personnel of this commission may well be left to the Allied leaders. The extent of its authority is more important. As the government of the Ruhr, it would become the legal owner of the coal fields in perpetuity. It would exercise police powers and all other administrative functions. Its first obligation would be to see that no Ruhr coal is ever used to set up new heavy industries, whether within the valley or in some other part of Germany. The second responsibility would be the use of Ruhr coal for the benefit of European reconstruction and development generally. Of course, no German should sit on the Ruhr's governing commission. In fact, no Germans should be left in the Ruhr at all. Their presence would lead to a repetition of the difficulties encountered in the Saar after World War I. The Ruhr must not be tied around the neck of the world security organization, as the Saar was bound to the League of Nations. The promise of a plebiscite after a term of years, which helped disrupt the Saar settlement, would not be necessary in the Ruhr. The people would not be under alien rule because they would not be there. Their places would be taken by French, Belgian, Dutch and other workers. The exodus from the Ruhr which was caused by Allied bombing was a more difficult experience for the Germans than their transfer in time of peace. It is unfortunate that so many of them were permitted to return. But the world cannot afford to have such a dangerous weapon as the Ruhr in German hands. The miners, factory hands, transportation and service workers—the whole German population—would be contributing their bit to a sound European settlement if they were sent back to seek their livelihood in the farms and shops of a de-industrialized Reich. Most of them probably would become workers on the land, and as such a far less potent force for war than they have been these last two generations.
Cf. H. Arendt: totalitarianism reduces men to impersonal natural forces * German philosophers in support of Nazism * Beethoven and Mauthausen * The Superior Race of Germans * Kalergi, European Spirit must Precede Europe's Political Unification * La Construction de l'Europe selon Jean Monnet * Plan Fouchet * Mitterrand and Kohl urge European Political Union * Il Manifesto di Ventotene