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Plato : PHILEBUS
Persons of the dialogue: Socrates - Protarchus - Philebus = Note by Elpenor |
79 Pages
Page 38
Soc. Let us then put into more precise terms the question which has arisen about pleasure and opinion. Is there such a thing as opinion?
Pro. Yes.
Soc. And such a thing as pleasure?
Pro. Yes.
Soc. And an opinion must of something?
Pro. True.
Soc. And a man must be pleased by something?
Pro. Quite correct.
Soc. And whether the opinion be right or wrong, makes no difference; it will still be an opinion?
Pro. Certainly.
Soc. And he who is pleased, whether he is rightly pleased or not will always have a real feeling of pleasure?
Pro. Yes; that is also quite true.
Soc. Then, how can opinion be both true and false, and pleasure true only, although pleasure and opinion are both equally real?
Pro. Yes; that is the question.
Soc. You mean that opinion admits of truth and falsehood, and hence becomes not merely opinion, but opinion of a certain quality; and this is what you think should be examined?
Pro. Yes.
Soc. And further, even if we admit the existence of qualities in other objects, may not pleasure and pain be simple and devoid of quality?
Pro. Clearly.
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