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ERNST BLOCH | |||||
From: Ernst Bloch, Essays on the philosophy of music, tr. by P. Palmer | |||||
Generally speaking, music as
expression is not so much rejected as outstripped or at least replaced
through a purportedly extra-human order. Instead of expressing the soul,
it now manifests itself as a copy of the cosmos, a reproduction of
cosmic conditions, much as it was thought that architecture would
reach its grandest consummation when it copied a cosmic system. If
formalistic music does not take the
structure of the world as its model, it does
believe in subject-less order, i.e. in music as a set of rules instead of
music as existence. From this standpoint, harmony and counterpoint appear
to be both self-sufficient
and transparent - and always transparent in mathematical-physical
terms. True, we do not hear numbers and formulae, but we are at least
supposed to discern forces in music which also occur in mechanical
processes, in dynamism and stasis, e.g. falling, discharging, equilibrium
and the like. But dialectics of Nature are less often mentioned in this
context, in spite of the dichotomy in the sonata's thematicism and
structural layout. Nor does Nature as a human symbol, heard through music,
come into the reckoning for what is now a one-sided external series. For in
a theory of rules which is as reified as this theory is, mechanics
alone will still be visible on the horizon, a mere reflex of mechanisation
in a secularised, formerly Keplerian Nature. Thus in the late-bourgeois
anti-expression theory of music and its reification of form, the
extrahuman very easily turns into the anti-human, and there is a clear
fundamental relation. Matter-of-factness [Sachlichkeit] is interpreted
entirely as a system of rules governing something alien. 'Music, moody
food of us that trade in love,' says Shakespeare; and yet there is no
connection between the hypostatised Cat's Fugue and Syrinx the
nymph or the stage of self-transcending, the utopian sound of one's source
and existence. Nonetheless, this distinction too is an artificial one and
just as artificial and abstract as the distinction between expression and
well-wrought form, which are in truth one and gladly support each other.
And similarly, music as a world of harmonic-contrapuntal rules is only at
odds with music as the utopian sound of existence if the world of rules
(i.e. a specific perfection of its means) has been reified and
absolutised; if the target of creating the best music is lost within a
music without a designation, a mere intrinsic guarantee of
melodic-contrapuntal consistency. When counterpoint has become an aural
form-fetish, the two musics are at war. But let us avoid this
absolutising. Let us assume that we have neither music in which we cannot
sense anything expressive, nor a corresponding science from which our
minds cannot derive anything enlightening. Then it is precisely in music's
theory of forms that its deep-seated and far-aiming intention will
instantly emerge and be set in motion. To counter the purely drifting and
vaguely warm element in the note, musical craftsmanship will then transmit
what is indeed a world of rules -not however an automatic one,
but the world of the human personages of Mozart, Bach and Beethoven,
which will have now become not a canon, but canonic. Then even the
ultimate transparence of an absolutised handicraft, music in its cosmic
relation -which is to say the harmony of the spheres, which has been
secularised time and again -will do no more damage in the end. Indeed it
must serve the best of purposes, serving as a prefiguration that will
allow Nature, too, to be heard as a ...pastorale, i.e. in humanly
significant terms. Thus the note is now going far
afield, and it has equipped itself for its journey. A note that is formed
possesses -and painters have always envied it for this -exact rules and
firm understanding. Of all the crafts, music was the earliest to be
rationalised; it did not only consist of empirically tested devices
and the trade secrets of the masters. Mutatis mutandis, the
geometry and rules of correct proportions explored by Leonardo and Durer
had dwelt for a long time within the musical canon. The ancient tradition
that promulgated music as a science was a principal reason for this
salutary rationalisation of it. So music became one of the seven 'liberal arts' in the mediaeval
university, and it entered the quadrivium. Certainly this tradition was
acquired at a high cost, the exaggerating of numerical relations, and it
had hardly any connection with the practice of music, to which Pythagorean
speculations were a downright hindrance. All the same, the traditional
rationalisation of music was a boon for the polyphonic style that appeared
in the eleventh century. Not Pythagoras but in all likelihood a closeness
to the scholastic way of teaching and thinking made possible the miracles
of ingenuity that were constructed by the contrapuntists of Burgundy and
Flanders. Painters went their empirical way through the studios; the
stonemasons had their lodge, where practical geometry and an oral
tradition of gnosis were combined in an often mysterious fashion. But in
music, the enrichment of the polyphonic style went hand in hand with the
penning of its rational theory -a Speculum musicae by Jean de
Muris, and from Jacob of Liège
in 1330, and an Ars nova and Ars contrapuncti by Philip of
Vitry. And there arose a connection which so far has never been followed
up and yet has sustained the proud rationality of counterpoint right up to
the present: a connection with scholastic logic or, to be more precise,
with its forms of combination. It is significant that Boëthius, who passed on the tradition of Greek
music theory in his Ars musica, translated and wrote commentaries
on Aristotelian logic for the same world and, in many cases, the same
people. Abelard praised Boëthius as showing absolute insight in musical
matters; if this verdict changed in the subsequent centuries of
counterpoint, it was supplanted by the authority of the manifold conversiones
and contrapositiones of a doctrine which Boëthius was again the
first to pass on. |
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