3. We assert, then, a plurality of Existents, but a plurality not fortuitous and therefore a plurality deriving from a unity.
But even admitting this derivation from a unity — a unity however not predicated of them in respect of their essential being — there is, surely, no reason why each of these Existents, distinct in character from every other, should not in itself stand as a separate genus.
Is, then, this unity external to the genera thus produced, this unity which is their source though it cannot be predicated of them in respect of their essence? it is indeed external; the One is beyond; it cannot, therefore, be included among the genera: it is the [transcendent] source, while they stand side by side as genera. Yet surely the one must somehow be included [among the genera]? No: it is the Existents we are investigating, not that which is beyond Existence.
We pass on, then, to consider that which is included, and find to our surprise the cause included with the things it causes: it is surely strange that causes and effects should be brought into the same genus.