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Translated by Stephen MacKenna and B. S. Page.
» Contents of this Ennead
128 pages - You are on Page 100
8. The division into elements must, in short, be abandoned, especially in regard to Sensible Substance, known necessarily by sense rather than by reason. We must no longer look for help in constituent parts, since such parts will not be substances, or at any rate not sensible substances.
Our plan must be to apprehend what is constant in stone, earth, water and the entities which they compose — the vegetal and animal forms, considered purely as sensibles — and to confine this constant within a single genus. Neither Matter nor Form will thus be overlooked, for Sensible Substance comports them; fire and earth and the two intermediaries consist of Matter and Form, while composite things are actually many substances in one. They all, moreover, have that common property which distinguishes them from other things: serving as subjects to these others, they are never themselves present in a subject nor predicated of any other thing. Similarly, all the characteristics which we have ascribed to Substance find a place in this classification.
But Sensible Substance is never found apart from magnitude and quality: how then do we proceed to separate these accidents? If we subtract them — magnitude, figure, colour, dryness, moistness — what is there left to be regarded as Substance itself? All the substances under consideration are, of course, qualified.
There is, however, something in relation to which whatever turns Substance into qualified Substance is accidental: thus, the whole of fire is not Substance, but only a part of it — if the term “part” be allowed.
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