Soc. That is what I am going to do, my dear friend. Do not, however, suppose I
shall let you out of the partnership; for I shall expect you to apply your
mind, and join with me in the consideration of the question.
La. I will if you think that I ought.
Soc. Yes, I do; but I must beg of you, Nicias, to begin again. You remember
that we originally considered courage to be a part of virtue. Nic. Very true.
Soc. And you yourself said that it was a part; and there were many other
parts, all of which taken together are called virtue.
Nic. Certainly.
Soc. Do you agree with me about the parts? For I say that justice, temperance,
and the like, are all of them parts of virtue as well as courage. Would you
not say the same?
Nic. Certainly.
Soc. Well then, so far we are agreed. And now let us proceed a step, and try
to arrive at a similar agreement about the fearful and the hopeful: I do not
want you to be thinking one thing and myself another. Let me then tell you my
own opinion, and if I am wrong you shall set me in my opinion the terrible and
the are the things which do or do not create fear, and fear is not of the
present, nor of the past, but is of future and expected evil. Do you not agree
to that, Laches?
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