Soc. And suppose I were to be asked by some one: What is that common quality,
Socrates, which, in all these uses of the word, you call quickness? I should
say the quality which accomplishes much in a little time-whether in running,
speaking, or in any other sort of action.
La. You would be quite correct.
Soc. And now, Laches, do you try and tell me in like manner, What is that
common quality which is called courage, and which includes all the various
uses of the term when applied both to pleasure and pain, and in all the cases
to which I was just now referring?
La. I should say that courage is a sort of endurance of the soul, if I am to
speak of the universal nature which pervades them all.
Soc. But that is what we must do if we are to answer the question. And yet I
cannot say that every kind of endurance is, in my opinion, to be deemed
courage. Hear my reason: I am sure, Laches, that you would consider courage to
be a very noble quality.
La. Most noble, certainly.
Soc. And you would say that a wise endurance is also good and noble? La. Very
noble.
Soc. But what would you say of a foolish endurance? Is not that, on the other
hand, to be regarded as evil and hurtful?
La. True.
Soc. And is anything noble which is evil and hurtful?
La. I ought not to say that, Socrates.
Soc. Then you would not admit that sort of endurance to be courage-for it is
not noble, but courage is noble?
La. You are right.
Soc. Then, according to you, only the wise endurance is courage?
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