Soc. And are not our two friends, Laches, at this very moment inviting us to
consider in what way the gift of virtue may be imparted to their sons for the
improvement of their minds?
La. Very true.
Soc. Then must we not first know the nature of virtue? For how can we advise
any one about the best mode of attaining something of which we are wholly
ignorant?
La. I do not think that we can, Socrates.
Soc. Then, Laches, we may presume that we know the nature of virtue? La. Yes.
Soc. And that which we know we must surely be able to tell?
La. Certainly.
Soc. I would not have us begin, my friend, with enquiring about the whole of
virtue; for that may be more than we can accomplish; let us first consider
whether we have a sufficient knowledge of a part; the enquiry will thus
probably be made easier to us.
La. Let us do as you say, Socrates.
Soc. Then which of the parts of virtue shall we select? Must we not select
that to which the art of fighting in armour is supposed to conduce? And is not
that generally thought to be courage?
La. Yes, certainly.
Soc. Then, Laches, suppose that we first set about determining the nature of
courage, and in the second place proceed to enquire how the young men may
attain this quality by the help of studies and pursuits. Tell me, if you can,
what is courage.
La. Indeed, Socrates, I see no difficulty in answering; he is a man of courage
who does not run away, but remains at his post and fights against the enemy;
there can be no mistake about that.
Soc. Very good, Laches; and yet I fear that I did not express myself clearly;
and therefore you have answered not the question which I intended to ask, but
another.
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