AL. Very true.

SO. Then if the eye is to see itself, it must look at the eye, and at that part of the eye where sight which is the virtue of the eye resides?

AL. True.

SO. And if the soul, my dear Alcibiades, is ever to know herself, must she not look at the soul; and especially at that part of the soul in which her virtue resides, and to any other which is like this?

AL. I agree, Socrates.

SO. And do we know of any part of our souls more divine than that which has to do with wisdom and knowledge?

AL. There is none.

SO. Then this is that part of the soul which resembles the divine; and he who looks at this and at the whole class of things divine, will be most likely to know himself?

AL. Clearly.

ΑΛ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ὀφθαλμὸς ἄρ΄ εἰ μέλλει ἰδεῖν αὑτόν͵ εἰς ὀφθαλμὸν αὐτῷ βλεπτέον͵ καὶ τοῦ ὄμματος εἰς ἐκεῖνον τὸν τόπον ἐν ᾧ τυγχάνει ἡ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετὴ ἐγγιγνομένη· ἔστι δὲ τοῦτό που ὄψις;

ΑΛ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ΄ οὖν͵ ὦ φίλε Ἀλκιβιάδη͵ καὶ ψυχὴ εἰ μέλλει γνώσεσθαι αὑτήν͵ εἰς ψυχὴν αὐτῇ βλεπτέον͵ καὶ μάλιστ΄ εἰς τοῦτον αὐτῆς τὸν τόπον ἐν ᾧ ἐγγίγνεται ἡ ψυχῆς ἀρετή͵ σοφία͵ καὶ εἰς ἄλλο ᾧ τοῦτο τυγχάνει ὅμοιον ὄν;

ΑΛ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ͵ ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἔχομεν οὖν εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς θειότερον ἢ τοῦτο͵ περὶ ὃ τὸ εἰδέναι τε καὶ φρονεῖν ἐστιν;

ΑΛ. Οὐκ ἔχομεν.

ΣΩ. Τῷ θεῷ ἄρα τοῦτ΄ ἔοικεν αὐτῆς͵ καί τις εἰς τοῦτο βλέπων καὶ πᾶν τὸ θεῖον γνούς͵ θεόν τε καὶ φρόνησιν͵ οὕτω καὶ ἑαυτὸν ἂν γνοίη μάλιστα.

ΑΛ. Φαίνεται.