Yet the Stoics were not altogether alien to the ordinary interests and
duties of life. They admitted a duty of co-operating in politics, at least
in such states as showed some desire for, or approach to, virtue. They
approved of the wise man taking part in education, of his marrying and
bringing up children, both for his own sake and his country’s. He will be
ready even to ‘withdraw himself from life on behalf of his country or his
friends. This ‘withdrawal,’ which was their word for suicide, came unhappily
to be much in the mouths of later, and especially of the Roman, Stoics, who,
in the sadness and restraint of prevailing despotism, came to thank God that
no one was compelled to remain in life; he might ‘withdraw’ when the burden
of life, the hopelessness of useful activity, became too great.
With this sad, stern, yet not undignified note, the philosophy of Greece
speaks its last word. The later scepticism of the New Academy, directed
mainly to a negative criticism of the crude enough logic of the Stoics, or
of the extravagances of their ethical doctrine, contributed no substantial
element to thought or morals. As an eclectic system it had much vogue, side
by side with Stoicism and Epicureanism, among the Romans, having as its
chief exponent Cicero, as Epicureanism had Lucretius, and Stoicism, Seneca.