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“Yet if anything exist which is eternal, immovable, freed from gross matter,
the contemplative science alone can apprehend this. Physical science
certainly cannot, for physics is of that which is ever in flux; nor can
mathematical science apprehend it; we must look to a mode of science prior
to and higher than both. The objects of physics are neither unchangeable nor
free from matter; the objects of mathematics are indeed unchangeable, but we
can hardly say they are free from matter; they have certainly relations with
matter. But the first and highest science has to do with that which is
unmoved and apart from matter; its function is with the eternal first causes
of things. There are therefore three modes of theoretical inquiry: the
science of physics, the science of mathematics, the science of God. For it
is clear that if the divine is anywhere, it must be in that form of
existence I have spoken of (i.e. in first causes)... . If, therefore, there
be any form of existence immovable, this we must regard as prior, and the
philosophy of this we must consider the first philosophy, universal for the
same reason that it is first. It deals with existence as such, inquiring
what it is and what are its attributes as pure existence.”
This is somewhat more technical than the language of Plato, but if we
compare it with what was said above we shall find an essential identity. Yet
Aristotle frequently impugns Plato’s doctrine of ideas, sometimes on the
lines already taken by Plato himself, sometimes in other ways. Thus (Met.
Z. 15, 16) he says: “That which is one cannot be in many places at
one time, but that which is common or general is in many places at one time.
Hence it follows that no universal exists apart from the individual things.
But those who hold the doctrine of ideas, on one side are right, viz. in
maintaining their separate existence, if they are to be substances or
existences at all. On the other side they are wrong, because by the idea or
form which they maintain to be separate they mean the one attribute
predicable of many things. The reason why they do this is because they
cannot indicate what these supposed imperishable essences are, apart from
the individual substances which are the objects of perception. The result is
that they simply represent them under the same forms as those of the
perishable objects of sensation which are familiar to our senses, with the
addition of a phrase—i.e. they say ‘man as such,’ ‘horse as such,’ or ‘the
absolute man,’ ‘the absolute horse.’”
A History of Greek Philosophy /
ARISTOTLE
