Again, some things are one in number, others in species, others in genus, others by analogy; in number those whose matter is one, in species those whose definition is one, in genus those to which the same figure of predication applies, by analogy those which are related as a third thing is to a fourth. The latter kinds of unity are always found when the former are; e.g. things that are one in number are also one in species, while things that are one in species are not all one in number; but things that are one in species are all one in genus, while things that are so in genus are not all one in species but are all one by analogy; while things that are one by analogy are not all one in genus.

Evidently 'many' will have meanings opposite to those of 'one'; some things are many because they are not continuous, others because their matter-either the proximate matter or the ultimate-is divisible in kind, others because the definitions which state their essence are more than one.

ἔτι δὲ τὰ μὲν κατ΄ ἀριθμόν ἐστιν ἕν͵ τὰ δὲ κατ΄ εἶδος͵ τὰ δὲ κατὰ γένος͵ τὰ δὲ κατ΄ ἀναλογίαν͵ ἀριθμῷ μὲν ὧν ἡ ὕλη μία͵ εἴδει δ΄ ὧν ὁ λόγος εἷς͵ γένει δ΄ ὧν τὸ αὐτὸ σχῆμα τῆς κατηγορίας͵ κατ΄ ἀναλογίαν δὲ ὅσα ἔχει ὡς ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο. ἀεὶ δὲ τὰ ὕστερα τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἀκολουθεῖ͵ οἷον ὅσα ἀριθμῷ καὶ εἴδει ἕν͵ ὅσα δ΄ εἴδει οὐ πάντα ἀριθμῷ· ἀλλὰ γένει πάντα ἓν ὅσαπερ καὶ εἴδει͵ ὅσα δὲ γένει οὐ πάν τα εἴδει ἀλλ΄ ἀναλογίᾳ· ὅσα δὲ ἀναλογίᾳ οὐ πάντα γένει. 

φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι τὰ πολλὰ ἀντικειμένως λεχθήσεται τῷ ἑνί· τὰ μὲν γὰρ τῷ μὴ συνεχῆ εἶναι͵ τὰ δὲ τῷ διαιρετὴν ἔχειν τὴν ὕλην κατὰ τὸ εἶδος͵ ἢ τὴν πρώτην ἢ τὴν τελευταίαν͵ τὰ δὲ τῷ τοὺς λόγους πλείους τοὺς τί ἦν εἶναι λέγοντας.