HE nature of the
divine thought involves certain problems; for while thought is held
to be the most divine of things observed by us, the question how it
must be situated in order to have that character involves
difficulties. For if it thinks of nothing, what is there here of
dignity? It is just like one who sleeps. And if it thinks, but this
depends on something else, then (since that which is its substance
is not the act of thinking, but a potency) it cannot be the best
substance; for it is through thinking that its value belongs to it.
Further, whether its substance is the faculty of thought or the act
of thinking, what does it think of? Either of itself or of something
else; and if of something else, either of the same thing always or
of something different. Does it matter, then, or not, whether it
thinks of the good or of any chance thing? Are there not some things
about which it is incredible that it should think?