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Translated by Stephen MacKenna and B. S. Page.
» Contents of this Ennead
128 pages - You are on Page 93
We conclude that nothing belonging to something else and predicated of it can be Substance. Substance is that which belongs essentially to itself, or, in so far as it is a part of the differentiated object, serves only to complete the Composite. Each or either part of the Composite belongs to itself, and is only affirmed of the Composite in a special sense: only qua part of the whole is it predicated of something else; qua individual it is never in its essential nature predicated of an external.
It may be claimed as a common element in Matter, Form and the Couplement that they are all substrates. But the mode in which Matter is the substrate of Form is different from that in which Form and the Couplement are substrates of their modifications.
And is it strictly true to say that Matter is the substrate of Form? Form is rather the completion which Matter’s nature as pure potentiality demands.
Moreover, Form cannot be said to reside in Matter [as in a substrate]. When one thing combines with another to form a unity, the one does not reside in the other; both alike are substrates of a third: thus, Man [the Form] and a man [the Composite] are substrates of their experiences, and are prior to their activities and consequents.
Substance, then, is that from which all other things proceed and to which they owe their existence; it is the centre of passivity and the source of action.
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