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Translated by Stephen MacKenna and B. S. Page.
» Contents of this Ennead
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20. We have to ascertain whether there is not to every quality a contrary. In the case of virtue and vice, even the mean appears to be contrary to the extremes.
But when we turn to colours, we do not find the intermediates so related. If we regard the intermediates as blendings of the extremes, we must not posit any contrariety other than that between black and white, but must show that all other colours are combinations of these two. Contrariety however demands that there be some one distinct quality in the intermediates, though this quality may be seen to arise from a combination.
It may further be suggested that contraries not only differ from each other, but also entail the greatest possible difference. But “the greatest possible difference” would seem to presuppose that intermediates have already been established: eliminate the series, and how will you define “the greatest possible”? Sight, we may be told, will reveal to us that grey is nearer than black to white; and taste may be our judge when we have hot, cold and no intermediate.
That we are accustomed to act upon these assumptions is obvious enough; but the following considerations may perhaps commend themselves:
White and yellow are entirely different from each other — a statement which applies to any colour whatsoever as compared with any other; they are accordingly contrary qualities. Their contrariety is independent of the presence of intermediates: between health and disease no intermediate intrudes, and yet they are contraries.
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