Yes, I replied; and yet I am not quite satisfied with this answer. By heaven,
and shall I tell you what I suspect? I will. Assuming that like, inasmuch as
he is like, is the friend of like, and useful to him-or rather let me try
another way of putting the matter: Can like do any good or harm to like which
he could not do to himself, or suffer anything from his like which he would
not suffer from himself? And if neither can be of any use to the other, how
can they be loved by one another? Can they now?
They cannot.
And can he who is not loved be a friend?
Certainly not.
But say that the like is not the friend of the like in so far as he is like;
still the good may be the friend of the good in so far as he is good?
True.
But then again, will not the good, in so far as he is good, be sufficient for
himself? Certainly he will. And he who is sufficient wants nothing-that is
implied in the word sufficient.
Of course not.
And he who wants nothing will desire nothing?
He will not.
Neither can he love that which he does not desire?