Soc. But then, my dear friend, if a man knew all good and evil, and how. they
are, and have been, and will be produced, would he not be perfect, and wanting
in no virtue, whether justice, or temperance, or holiness? He would possess
them all, and he would know which were dangers' and which were not, and guard
against them whether they were supernatural or natural; and he would provide
the good, as he would know how to deal both with gods or men.
Nic. I think, Socrates, that there is a great deal of truth in what you say.
Soc. But then, Nicias, courage, according to this new definition of yours,
instead of being a part of virtue only, will be all virtue? Nic. It would seem
so.
Soc. But we were saying that courage is one of the parts of virtue? Nic. Yes,
that was what we were saying.
Soc. And that is in contradiction with our present view?
Nic. That appears to be the case.
Soc. Then, Nicias, we have not discovered what courage is.
Nic. We have not.
La. And yet, friend Nicias,l imagined that you would have made the discovery,
when you were so contemptuous of the answers which I made to Socrates. I had
very great hopes that you would have been enlightened by the wisdom of Damon.
Nic. I perceive, Laches, that you think nothing of having displayed your
ignorance of the nature of courage, but you look only to see whether I have
not made a similar display; and if we are both equally ignorant of the things
which a man who is good for anything should know, that, I suppose, will be of
no consequence. You certainly appear to me very like the rest of the world,
looking at your neighbour and not at yourself. I am of opinion that enough has
been said on the subject which we have been discussing; and if anything has
been imperfectly said, that may be hereafter corrected by the help of Damon,
whom you think to laugh down, although you have never seen him, and with the
help of others. And when I am satisfied myself, I will freely impart my
satisfaction to you, for I think that you are very much in want of knowledge.