Soc. And deformity or disgrace may be equally measured by the opposite
standard of pain and evil?
Pol. Certainly.
Soc. Then when of two beautiful things one exceeds in beauty, the measure of
the excess is to be taken in one or both of these; that is to say, in pleasure
or utility or both?
Pol. Very true.
Soc. And of two deformed things, that which exceeds in deformity or disgrace,
exceeds either in pain or evil - must it not be so?
Pol. Yes.
Soc. But then again, what was the observation which you just now made, about
doing and suffering wrong? Did you not say, that suffering wrong was more
evil, and doing wrong more disgraceful?
Pol. I did.
Soc. Then, if doing wrong is more disgraceful than suffering, the more
disgraceful must be more painful and must exceed in pain or in evil or both:
does not that also follow?
Gorgias part 2 of 3. You are at part 1
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